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Abstract
We created conceptual models that people may use to analyze and forecast the
dynamic effects of open innovation, which we applied to the smartphone sector
using a model-based analysis approach. In addition, we built an open innovation
simulation model for the smartphone sector. The dynamic model of open innovation
linked logic and concepts relating to open innovation, complex adaptive systems,
and evolutionary change. The model can be used to analyze the dynamic effects of
open innovation strategies and open innovation simulation for the selection of
future strategies.
Keywords: Open innovation, Complex adaptive system, Evolutionary change,
Smartphone
Research question: background
As the knowledge-based economy develops, the amount of knowledge in the world
rapidly increases along with the velocity of circulation. Firms are increasingly utilizing
not only their own technologies, but also external knowledge and other technologies.
In addition, the open innovation phenomenon is rapidly spreading into many indus-
tries, nationwide, and worldwide, as firms provide their unused technologies to be uti-
lized by others. User innovation, customer innovation, collective intelligence,
crowdsourcing and open source innovations will be referred to as open innovation
(OI) in that they are innovation based on the transfers across the boundaries of know-
ledge and technology. The life cycles of cutting-edge products are becoming shorter
and shorter, and brand-new products of firms are routinely being imitated by others.
This is called the commodity trap and is getting increasingly common. Consequently,
as a process enabling the relentless innovation of technology, OI is receiving more and
more attention (D’Aveni 2010). Given this situation, we wanted to answer the following
questions.
What kind of dynamic effects can be drawn out from complex innovation systems
and market evolution driven by OI strategies and open business models for firms?
What is the trend in the modern smartphone sector, with particular focus on the
strict competition among Apple, Samsung, and Nokia?
Here, we will build up a model that can be used to analyze and forecast the dynamic
effects of open innovation and apply it to the smartphone sector using a model-based
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analysis and an agent-based modeling (ABM) simulation. We will search for solutions
to the following specific questions by building up a dynamic model of OI.
1) What kind of effects can OI at a firm level, give to and take from, complex adaptive
systems, such as the national innovation system (NIS), regional innovation system
(RIS), and sectoral innovation system (SIS) (Nelson and Winter 1982)?
2) How can firms escape falling into the commodity trap and suffering from a
harmfully shortened product life cycle when engaged in the dynamic process of
open innovation?
3) How do a dominant design and technological regime appear, change, and disappear
in the dynamic process of open innovation?
4) What is the status of specific technologies, or other knowledge selected by firms, in
the market during the dynamic process of open innovation?
With this study, we seek to set up a theory about the whole process by which open
innovation (OI) is realized at firm level. Concretely speaking, it is a theory about all the
processes by which new ideas or technologies are adopted by a firm, how they are used
to create new products or processes, and how, in the end, they are incorporated into a
dominant design. More industries are increasingly confronted by the peril of the com-
modity trap in which imitation or the pursuit of cutting-edge products is made within
very short time frames. For this reason, a firm needs to dynamically analyze the impacts
of its own OI strategy at the introductory stages of new knowledge, technologies, or
ideas. In analyzing the open innovation of a firm, we cannot fully understand and
analyze the whole open innovation process without analyzing the dynamic process of
specific OI strategies. First of all, concrete OI strategies of firms, and analyses of the dy-
namic processes involved, are more important than ever. OI, at a firm level, is no lon-
ger an option but a must for the survival of not only corporate giants, the likes of IBM,
3M, or Intel, but also of small and medium enterprises (SMEs; Vrande et al. 2009;).
Literature review
The need for a new approach for firms to deal with the increasing OI phenomenon in
the form of strategies, business models, user innovation, collective intelligence, and
crowdsourcing, is on the rise. Firms need new ways to escape the commodity trap and
to prevent injury from short product life cycles.
There is also a need for connections within OI, at a firm level, complex adaptive sys-
tems, such as RIS, SIS, and NIS, and an evolutionary change in markets. There needs
to be a research framework aimed at solving this problem. Finally, we want to under-
stand the total cycle of innovation in firms: from new ideas to new products and from
a dominant design to the choice of the technological regime (Lee and Lim 2001). The
following are theories intended to answer these questions (Heredero and Berzosa
2012). First, resource- and knowledge-based theories treat OI as a way to exploit re-
sources and knowledge complementarities (Mowery et al. 1996; Das and Teng 2000;
Nonaka 1994; Simon 1991). This resource-based perspective focuses on strategies for
exploiting existing firm-specific assets (Teece et al. 1997). Well-known companies, such
as IBM, Texas Instruments, Philips, and others appear to have followed a “resource-
based strategy” wherein they accumulate valuable technology assets, often guarded by
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an aggressive intellectual property policy (Teece et al. 1997; Shuen 1994). However, this
theory cannot explain the dynamic changes that originate from occurrences, such as
the commodity trap and shortened product life cycles.
Second, according to the Transaction Cost Theory, open innovation will decrease
transaction costs through vertical disintegration of firms. This theory was derived from
the Coase Theorem and New Institutional Economics (Coase 1937; Williamson 1991;
Kogut 1988; Jacobides and Winter 2005). Although this logic does not concentrate on
the strategy of a firm, it coincides with the direction of this study where it focuses on
establishing and analyzing a model of the dynamic process of open innovation. But
what the Transaction Cost Theory can explain is not the dynamics but just the useful-
ness of OI in restricted areas, such as cost reduction (Jacobides and Winter 2005).
Third, the history-friendly model might be used to analyze and predict dynamic
changes in economic phenomena through history divergent simulation by a history rep-
lication method (Malerba et al. 2001; Malerba et al. 1999a, b, 2001, 2008; Nelson and
Winter 1982; Yoon and Lee 2009). However, the basic analysis target of the history-
friendly model is not a firm but a sectorial innovation system. Consequently, it has
limits for the simulation analysis of the dynamic process caused by OI at a firm
(e.g., business model or strategy). After all, the analysis beyond history replication
is left in a black box because this theory has adopted an approach based on simu-
lation at the level of sectorial innovation system. Our study focuses on the analysis
of the black box itself, the dynamic change that OI brings about to a firm.
Fourth, according to the Dynamic Capabilities Theory, collaborative innovation is
established to develop the dynamic capabilities of a firm, and thus, enhances its com-
petitive advantage. This theory was proposed and developed by several firm strategy re-
search groups and Schumpeterian economists (Teece and Pisano 1994; Teece et al.
1997; Teece et al. 1997; Arthur 1994). The dynamic capabilities framework analyzes the
sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise firms operat-
ing in environments with rapid technological change (Teece et al. 1997). According to
this theory, the competitive advantage of firms is seen resting on distinctive processes
(e.g., ways of coordinating and combining) shaped by the specific asset positions of
each firm (e.g., portfolio of hard to trade knowledge assets and complementary assets)
and the evolutionary paths it adopted or inherited (Teece et al. 1997). But dynamic
Capabilities Theory cannot directly explain the trigger of dynamic capabilities. There is
no sufficient explanation to the starting point of the introduction of new ideas, know-
ledge, or technology, as a dynamic activity performed by a firm. To discuss dynamic
capabilities at a corporate level, our study seeks to build up a model of the dynamic
processes involved in OI to analyze those processes, starting from the decision of a firm
to adopt an OI strategy, and then apply it to the current smartphone sector.
Fifth, evolutionary theories of business activity note that some firms struggle to meet
the demands of their environments and reside at the margins of survival (Fortune and
Mitchell 2012). In turn, selection processes remove struggling firms from the business
landscape, if they fail to improve (Nelson and Winter 1982; Aldrich 1999). According
to this theory, firms survive by overcoming the obstacles as they dissolve their obsolete
skills or assets and by acquiring required new skills or assets (Fortune and Mitchell 2012).
However, this theory does not well explain both radical innovation, which arises fre-
quently and appears in unpredictable ways, and acquisition and dissolution aimed directly
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at knowledge and technology, in a knowledge-based age. In other words, what is required
is a direct analysis of the concrete dynamic processes at a corporate level. Thus, our study
seeks to find out how evolutionary technology management and strategy, i.e., open
innovation technology management strategy at a corporate level, evolves in a complex
adaptive system.
For all these reasons, we need to develop a theoretical concept model that can explain
the processes from open innovation of new ideas or technology to the appearance of a
dominant design and the evolution of NIS, RIS, or SIS. The growing literature on strategic
alliances, the virtual corporation, buyer-supplier relations, and technology collaboration
indicates the importance of external integration and sourcing (Teece et al. 1997). Namely,
there is a growing necessity to analyze the dynamic process of open innovation, which is
the subject of this study.
Model building: methods
There is a deep relationship between these three factors (open innovation, complex
adaptive systems, and evolutionary change) and they are arranged in a conceptual order
based on the name of the model, not in a temporal order. Conceptually, open
innovation at a firm goes through a complex adaptive system and then leads to evolu-
tionary change. However, in reality, a specific complex adaptive system can trigger OI
through evolutionary properties at any given firm. The OCE conceptual model in Fig. 1
is based on the conceptual order that is needed to analyze the dynamic changes trig-
gered by OI at an individual firm.
The basic agent of open innovation is the firm. The agent chooses action based on its
own independent judgment. Its actions influence other agencies or environments, and
also be influenced by agencies and environments. In that sense, social organizations,
individuals, and governments can be agents of open innovation as well. Firms make
various degrees of open innovation (incremental to radical, inbound or outbound)
through diverse channels and corporate open innovation influences NIS, RIS, and SIS.
The complex adaptive system exhibits various levels of emergence from price or
product differentiation to change in dominant design or even emergence of new
Fig. 1 OCE model concept
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sectors. The complex adaptive system influences evolutionary change in corporate open
innovation by way of strange trigger. This might include a certain degree of accordance
of fascinating customer groups with the technology regime, technological capabilities of
related SIS, RIS, or NIS, and the existence and level of rival firms or suppliers. Of
course, unique historical heritage, location, ecosystem, or environment of the
innovation system are unique features, which work as an strange trigger with certain ef-
fects on the diverse OI activities of a firm.
Corporate OI goes through evolutionary stages in the market, blooming into various
types and levels of emergence, or being influenced by strange triggers, under complex
adaptive systems. The basic locus of evolution is a market. Corporate OI shows up as
dominant design thanks to various evolutionary factors (e.g., economies of scale and
scope, economics of networks, or open business models). After all these, corporate OI
creates a market lock-in, by initiating path dependence and forming a technology re-
gime. The degree of corporate OI creates a variety of evolutionary effects according to
the degree of complexity of the complex adaptive systems.
This OCE conceptual model can be analyzed by case studies. Furthermore, the OCE
agent based model (ABM) can be built to simulate the situation (Carcia et al. 2007). It
is based on the premise of building the model to analyze the courses of open
innovation, the complex adaptive system, and evolutionary change, starting from strat-
egy at a corporate level.
We will now assemble the OCE model in three stages. First, we will build up
open innovation factors, processes, and their connections with complex adaptive
systems. Second, we will build up diverse complex adaptive system factors and
their relationships with open innovation and evolutionary change (Yoon, and Lee
2009;). Third, we will construct evolutionary change that results from a complex
adaptive system and its interaction with open innovation (Malerba et al. 1999a, b,
2008).
Open innovation in the OCE model
All innovation based on the inflow and outflow of technologies, knowledge, and ideas
crossing the boundary of firms, is considered “open innovation”, which is the intended
target of the OCE model.
On one hand, it is a fact that the concept of an agent of open innovation has under-
gone substantial change over time. Schumpeter thought of an entrepreneur, a person,
as the agency of innovation in the initial stage of his research, and a large company as
the agency in the latter stage (Schumpeter 1934, 1942). After a discussion of the strat-
egy at a corporate or national level was activated by Porter (1980, 1990), approaches to
open innovation strategy in institutes, such as firms, social organizations, or govern-
ment agencies, have also been discussed, analyzed, and carried forward diversely in dir-
ect or indirect methods. In the discussion centered on the firm as the basic agent in
OCE model analysis, open innovation inside the firm becomes the target of its strategy.
On the other hand, open innovation outside a firm, which can result in a market or
system failure, is the target of government policy.
The OCE model, as an open innovation channel, takes into consideration the factors
on the technology-pushed side, as well as the factors on market-driven side (e.g.,
Yun et al. Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity  (2016) 2:7 Page 5 of 22
collaboration, acquisition and merging, licensing, customers, suppliers, competing
firms, university and national research laboratories, etc.). In reality, an apparent disjunc-
tion between changes in technology and productivity can be observed, for instance during
the so-called “productivity paradox” of the 1980s and 1990s (Tunzelmann and Wang
2007). The reason is that, first of all, in shaping production function, traditional theories
or the Dynamic Capabilities Theory failed to take into consideration the source of new
knowledge and technology. It is not only the capabilities of producers that should be
taken into consideration as bases of productivity or dynamic change but also the capabil-
ities of consumers (Tunzelmann and Wang 2007). One of the important considerations in
the OCE model is the various channels through which knowledge and technology flow in.
For example, open innovation considers merging and acquiring (M&A) as an open
innovation channel to acquire tacit knowledge. The embeddedness of key capabilities and
the knowledge that they embody, often motivate firms to acquire an entire entity to obtain
these capabilities, as opposed to simply licensing specific goods or hiring employees
(Capron et al. 1998). In fact, the higher the level of corporate scale a firm has, the more it
seeks complete, open innovation, including tacit knowledge as well as codified knowledge
through M&A.
From the corporate viewpoint, the degree of OI varies from incremental, representing
the improvement of existing products, to radical innovation, representing the launching
of completely new products on global markets as well as into domestic markets.
The difference in the degree of OI causes the appearance of the emergence at various
levels of the complex adaptive system (CAS). Regarding the relation between the level
of OI and corporate achievement, there is a reverse U-curve in the quantitative analysis
of the relation between the OI and corporate achievements of a great number of firms
(Laursen and Salter 2006). However, the relation between the degree of corporate OI
activity and corporate achievement will vary according to the corporate environment
(Drnevich and Kriauciunas 2011). Namely, it is useless to make a quantitative analysis
of the relation between the degree of corporate OI and achievement. Rather, it is rea-
sonable to make an analysis of the dynamic process of the corporate OI strategy, that
is, the process for achieving the OI strategy of a specific firm, which is what OCE
model analysis is intended for.
Quantitative analysis of the determinants of OI showed a variety of factors that deter-
mine the success of OI, such as attitude toward openness, entrepreneurship, internal
system for openness, and capability for corporate absorption (Yun and Mohan, 2012a).
Of course, the RIS, NIS, or SIS under which a firm functions (as factors external to the
firm) were presented by way of a quantitative analysis of factors to determine the level
of achievement of OI. According to an OCE model approach, related to the analysis of
the processes of dynamic change resulting from a corporate OI strategy, corporate
achievement is not determined by the specific factors of open innovation. Rather, the
factors that determine corporate achievement during the dynamic processes of OI work
differently, and in some cases, the same factors have quite different effects. Namely,
only through an analysis of the dynamic effects of open innovation is it possible to find
the concrete factors that influence the achievement of OI, at a corporate level, and to
analyze this influence.
On one hand, the degree of corporate OI determines how well the firm catches up
with the leading firm in the belonging sector. Catch-up strategies basically assumes
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three patterns, namely, path-following catching-up, stage-skipping catching-up, and
path-creating catching-up, which have target sectors of other national innovations
(Lee and Lim 2001). In a knowledge-based economy, when a technological life
cycle is being shortened, technological catch-up types move from path-following
catching-up based on a closed innovation strategy to stage-skipping catching-up,
pursuing a medium degree of open innovation and a path-creating catching-up pat-
tern with a high degree of open innovation. The higher the degree of corporate
OI, the more rapidly and creatively a related firm can catch up. The model to de-
termine a catch-up pattern includes, as internal determinants, factors representing
OI, an example of which is an access to an external knowledge base or other avail-
able knowledge and resources.
Complex adaptive systems in the OCE Model
Currently, the topic of complexity is attracting a great deal of interest, but there re-
mains a question of what can be said meaningfully about complexity (Simon 1995).
There are several complexity theories like Chaos Theory in mathematics that deal with
the complexity of nonlinear dynamic systems whose long-term behavior is unpredict-
able. Systems theory, which possesses many interacting components, deals with another
form of complexity. There is also the Computational Complexity Theory that uses
agent-based modeling. This theory is applied to physical and economic issues all to-
gether. Complex systems arise naturally in the economy because economic agents,
whether they are banks, consumers, firms, or investors, continually adjust their moves,
purchasing decisions, prices, and forecasts in response to the situations these moves, deci-
sions, prices, or forecasts create in the market (Arthur 1999, 2009). The complexity in this
study includes computational complexity as it uses a computer for analysis. The factors
used to configure the system respond to and have an influence on the system itself. For
this reason, it is called a complex adaptive system (Fleming and Sorenson 2001). Enter-
prises, which are representative agents and which make up complex systems, are not just
collections of production factors, they are “repositories of competence” that create, coord-
inate, and deploy knowledge. In this case, it is the knowledge of the “specific connections
that seem to work in a particular environment” (Potts 2001).
The degree of complexity of a complex adaptive system is shown concretely by the
degree of competition between firms or institutions in that system (Choi et al. 2001;
Surana et al. 2005). Complexity arises when the dependencies among the elements be-
come important, and complex adaptive systems are composed of interacting, thoughtful
agents such as firms, customers, or banks (Miller and Page 2009).
Complex adaptive systems usually operate for a global optimum, and exhibit many
levels of aggregation and interaction (Holland and Miller 1991). Innovation systems are
themselves complex adaptive systems composed of complex structures of complex pop-
ulations (Kastelle et al. 2009). There are several kinds of complex adaptive systems in
innovation systems, among them are the national innovation system (NIS), the regional
innovation system (RIS), and the sectoral innovation system (SIS). The complexity of
NIS as a complex adaptive system varies among countries. In the end, the results of
corporate OI can determine the creativeness and complexity of the NIS. The differences
in the creativeness and complexity among NISs are determined by corporate open
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innovation, while the degree or level of corporate OI is influenced by the institutions that
form the NIS. As a complex adaptive system, the NIS is a reflection of the firms, major af-
filiated agencies, complementarities, self-organization, and proper emergence of the com-
plex adaptive systems in it (Manzini 2009).
Meanwhile, the OI of firms can determine the creativeness and complexity of the be-
longing RIS. At the same time, the openness and creativeness of the belonging cluster
or RIS, can determine the degree of OI of the firms (Cooke 2005). For example, in
Taiwan, the foundation of the Hsinchu Cluster in which knowledge, technology and
capital are free to flow through connections to Silicon Valley, is ascertained through
the activation of diverse OI activities of the belonging firms (Saxenian and Hsu 2005).
Corporate OI can increase the creativeness and complexity of a specific sector, while
the sectoral innovation system determines the OI of the related firms. Although corpor-
ate OI has an effect on the improvement of corporate differentiated competitiveness, it
increases the complexity and creativeness of the SIS if it is combined with various posi-
tive feedback loops, such as economies of scale, network effects, and open innovation
business models. If this occurs, the existing dominant design in the related SIS fades
away, and fierce competition occurs to establish a new dominant design. Dominant
firms of the belonging SIS change rapidly, new markets are set up, or the initial market
size and the SIS scope rapidly expand. In the end, the sectoral specificities in the geog-
raphy of a corporate location are determined by corporate OI, that is, how the firms in
the SIS combine their knowledge, technology, and manufacture of products (Bottazzi et
al. 2005).
Complex adaptive systems (NIS, RIS, or SIS) lead open innovation of firms in specific
directions. The existence of a fascinating customer group in some sectors plays the role
of an strange trigger, and this makes innovation systems accept the OI made in the sec-
tor more easily. Triggering effects may also occur in the case of innovation systems
with R&D capabilities and technology capabilities focused in the related sector. Certain
firms may influence universities by funding, while national university systems crucially
affect the competitive advantage of firms in the global market (Francisco et al. 2007).
The features and properties of an innovation system act as determinants of acceptance,
regarding both the degree and direction of OI of individual firms.
Political intervention by governments is required to enhance the level of openness in
complex adaptive systems, or to promote the activation of NIS, RIS, and SIS, through
knowledge production, distribution, and consumption. To fix a system failure is to con-
nect technology to markets continuously by making sufficient knowledge and technol-
ogy available in the innovation system. Government intervention in system failures of
complex adaptive systems is aimed at promoting the OI of individual firms. Conse-
quently, the core responsibility of a government is to build an open NIS, open RIS, or
open SIS, which in turn produce and distribute new knowledge and technology into
the innovation system by enhancing the complexity of the complex adaptive system,
that is, the openness of the innovation system.
Evolutionary change in the OCE Model
Evolutionary economics inherited from Schumpeter’s legacy involves coevolution of na-
tional industries, technology, and institutions, such as universities, research laboratories,
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and patents (Nelson 1994). This study does not analyze evolutionary results at the level of
the economy, but looks at evolutionary effects reached as a result of differentiation strat-
egies by which OI is established at a specific firm. At the current rates of growth in know-
ledge, rates of its use and formation of positive feedback loops of new types (e.g., SNS),
and the selection of OI strategies at a corporate level, produces rapid evolutionary results
in markets. This phenomenon, the evolutionary results from OI at corporate levels in
markets, is applicable not only to large, market-dominating companies, but also to SMEs.
Before firms could carry forward OI strategies, they should check the evolutionary effects
of related OI strategies, which are linked to corporate competitiveness and profits. The
time frame from open innovation to evolutionary results is being shortened very sharply.
How cutting-edge, new technological products face falling into the commodity trap in
such short times is the proof of the current, shortened, technology life cycle.
An evolutionary model of technological change is proposed in which a technological
breakthrough, or discontinuity, initiates an era of intense technical variation and selec-
tion, culminating in a single dominant design product (Anderson and Tushman 1990).
Namely, the pinnacle of evolution in innovation is the very formation of a dominant
design. A dominant design goes through a variety of incremental technical progressions
according to the differentiation strategies of many firms, by way of open innovation. A
dominant design is not fixed. It goes through an evolutionary process created by the OI
based on the discontinuous technology of a firm, and then forms another dominant
design.
Companies with the best products will not always win, as chance events may cause
“lock-in” of inferior technologies (Arthur 1983). The process from dominant design for-
mation to its lock-in is the evolutionary result of open innovation based on new know-
ledge and technology. Various dynamic evolutionary powers trigger the process from
dominant design formation to its lock-in. Similar to biological evolution, the evolution
of markets related to technological innovation is never locked-in forever. While switch-
ing costs may favor the incumbent during rapid technological change, switching costs
can become quickly swamped by switching benefits (Teece et al. 1997). Increasing
returns, network effects, economies of scope, and open business models are the forces
that enable switching benefits to surpass switching costs.
In economics, positive feedback arises from increasing returns (Arthur 1994).
In economies, a positive feedback loop is the driving force making a specific
technology win a position of a dominant design on the market and then creating
a lock-in. The market mechanisms that make up this positive feedback loop are
economies of scale, economies of scope, economies of network, and open busi-
ness models.
Economies of scale are a positive feedback loop on the supply-side that increases
supply so long as profit increases in direct proportion to the increase in supply. In
cases where increasing returns are caused by economies of scale, a lock-in for
current technology occurs. If one among the competing technologies happens to
be adopted by historical events, and increasing returns are created through econ-
omies of scale, this technology becomes a dominant design and gradually becomes
locked-in (Arthur 1989).
Economies of scope are another positive feedback loop on the supply side. It
is more efficient for a single supplier to supply a variety of products than for
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different suppliers to supply products singly in the same product field. This
logic also justifies M&A in microeconomics. When various new types of open
innovation occur in a traditional manufacturing industry, they undergo an evo-
lutionary process to a dominant design and a lock-in through economies of
scope. However, evolutionary phenomena, based on economies of scale or
scope, lose their power the moment the positive feedback stops. If alternative
technology appears suddenly through the OI of another firm, and is powered
by the positive feedback loop, the existing dominant design can disappear sud-
denly (Anderson and Tushman 1990).
Economies of network form a positive feedback loop on the demand side. Demand
increases geometrically as the bandwagon effect occurs in proportion to the increase in
demand. For example, as the number of Microsoft (MS) office users grows, more
people are likely to use it. In addition, the exchange and distribution of documents,
which were produced by MS Office, becomes more convenient. Accordingly, the num-
ber of users of MS office increases more. A variety of social network systems (SNSs,
such as Facebook, Twitter, and KakaoTalk) also have positive feedback loops based on
economies of network. A creative open innovation based on a new idea evolves into a
new dominant design if it is powered by a positive feedback loop thanks to the econ-
omies of network based on fortuitous initial users. This positive feedback loop on the
demand side has a relatively solid and long-term sustainability. Sales of the QWERTY
keyboard have been solidly sustained through keyboards that are more efficient, and it
has been developed since it evolved into a dominant design based on the economies of
network. Such long sustainability is possible if a new idea reaches the status of domin-
ant design because of the economies of network and even a minimal, steady effect from
economies of scale is present at some level.
An open business model has features similar to an evolutionary game. It refers
to a phenomenon in which there is a positive feedback loop wherein consumers of
products turn into producers of products, then, the said producers turn back into
consumers, now concentrating more on related products. For example, the Apple
App Store is an open business model where consumers of Apps may turn into
producers of Apps then go on to consume more Apps (Chesbrough 2006). Namely,
it is a positive feedback loop in which economies of network coincide with econ-
omies of scale on both the demand and supply sides. Apple’s iTunes, iBook, and
Passbook also possess features of open business models. In the case of firms reach-
ing a dominant design through evolution by use of an open business model, it has
a very solid evolutionary quality even if this may not cause rapid growth like that
based on economies of scale (based on supply). Its positive feedback loop is made
relatively stable by economies of network (demand), and considerable self-supply
occurs simultaneously as some consumers become producers as well. In the posi-
tive feedback loop of an open business model, consumers turn into suppliers and
supply diverse products that are not comparable with those produced due to econ-
omies of scope.
The smart phone market case: results and discussion
We will apply this model to three agents in the smartphone sector (Samsung, Apple,
and Nokia). In this OCE conceptual model of the smartphone sector, we will analyze
Yun et al. Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity  (2016) 2:7 Page 10 of 22
the open innovation of the three agents, the appearance of the complex adaption sys-
tem, and the evolutionary change in the sector.
Second, we will build up an OCE simulation model based on ABM, then, simulate
the open innovation of the three major agents, the changing of smartphone sector at
complex adaptive system, and the evolutionary change in the market. Based on these
OCE models (conceptual and simulation), we expect to explain the reality of the smart-
phone sector in more detail, and then create appropriate strategies or policies for each
major agent.
This OCE conceptual model is intended for the smartphone sector, and the agents
Samsung, Apple, and Nokia. The target of analysis is limited to these three firms, and
its scope to the smartphone sector. The interval of this analysis covers from the release
date of the iPhone, from 11st June 2007 to 30th November 2012.
First, let us look into the open innovation of three firms. Samsung’s OI strategy is in
total contrast to that of Apple’s. Most core components of the hardwares of the smart-
phone depend on self-production (i.e., processor, camera module, display, and commu-
nication module, are all produced by Samsung, with its own assembly line operation)
and assembly in the cities of Suwon, Asan, Tangjeong, and Gumi in Korea. Further-
more, almost all smartphone hardware production personnel are full-time workers. By
retaining a large number of smartphone hardware research personnel, Samsung gained
second position after IBM for achievements in patent applications and registrations in the
U.S. In this area, Samsung is fully focused on self-development (R&D, production, and as-
sembly) of the four major components, based on closed innovation. This closed
innovation strategy enabled very rapid development of new models of smartphone hard-
ware. Samsung has used a strategy of diversification to various sizes and styles of hard-
ware, and has created new markets based on five-inch smartphones and the smart pencil.
However, Samsung pursued quite a different strategy for its smartphone software.
When Samsung, which enjoyed market dominance second only to Nokia in the feature
phone field, entered the smartphone industry, it did not have a smartphone operating
system (OS). Because of this, Samsung pursued the strategy of allowing global enter-
prises to provide diverse software for its smartphone, and of producing the smartphone
hardware for itself. It licensed Microsoft Windows, which had overwhelmed the exist-
ing global computer OS market, and released the Omnia Phone around June 2009,
soon after the release of Apple’s iPhone. In the end, Samsung introduced Google an-
droid OS for its own smartphone and arrived at global success. Later, Samsung devel-
oped the Bada OS based on the Open Source Software of Linux. Bada OS was applied
to the Samsung Smart TV, which then overwhelmed the global market, and to its
smartphone targeted at the EU market. Samsung then launched a joint development of
the new smartphone OS for a new global market with Nokia. As Nokia’s smartphone
OS strategy is currently changing, Samsung is gearing up to develop the new smart-
phone OS Tizen based on open source software with a Linux foundation, and with
Intel as a major partner for the joint development. Now, again, Samsung is preparing
to develop and release a smartphone utilizing the MS Windows 8. Samsung is pursuing
typical OI strategies for the development of smartphone software (e.g., OS based on
open source, licensing MS OS, and joint R&D with Nokia and Intel).
Next, let us look at the process by which Apple developed its smartphone. Its OS was
developed by a typical closed innovation method. By performing R&D based on OS
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capabilities accumulated while developing the iPod, iTunes, and the Apple computer,
Apple entered the smartphone OS field and continues to develop products there, now
going forward to version iOS6.0. It is perfecting the concept of OS by developing a sin-
gle OS for both SmartPad and smartphones. It is also showing competitiveness by con-
tinuously adding to diverse open business models based on its OS (e.g., News Board,
iTunes, iBook, Passbook, and iTunes). Besides this, it is upgrading its ever-
differentiating OS functions (including voice recognition functions, such as Siri), more
frequently than any other smartphone-manufacturing company.
In contrast to its software strategies, Apple pursues open innovation strategies for
outsourcing almost all of its hardware (display, processor, camera module, and commu-
nication module) and assembly. Apple outsources almost all its hardware needs to
companies that have the best technology and patent holdings in the world (Samsung
for its processor, LG for its display, and the camera module from a Japanese firm) and
has its assembly done by firms in Taiwan and China. Apple retained major product
concepts, core design patents, and system patents related to smartphone hardware.
Apple, with its OI-type hardware expansion strategy, has supply cycles of at least 1 year,
which is relatively long in this market. Consequently, Apple’s smartphone hardware is
not particularly diverse.
At the time the Apple iPhone appeared, Nokia reigned supreme in the global feature
phone and smartphone markets. In fact, Nokia developed the world’s first smartphone
hardware called “Simon.” It first appeared in the “Wireless World Conference”, an inter-
national mobile phone exhibition in 1993. This smartphone was like an ordinary mobile
phone, equipped with the first LCD display and an embedded PDA.
However, Nokia dominated the global feature phone market and became the leading
developer of the smartphone; it failed to create a strategy to lead the smartphone
market.
At the time, Nokia was also dominating the global market in the field of smart-
phone OS through the Symbian. The Symbian OS was released in 2001, long be-
fore smartphones became popular. Although it used to have a market share of
about 80 % as the top smartphone OS, it has been losing popularity. Although it
had decreased, it still had a market share of 41 % as of October 2010. Since Nokia
was first, it had a big lead over its rivals. Because Nokia released Symbian as an
open source OS in 2008, it has been managed by a foundation in which the major
global mobile phone makers participate. Nowadays, some members have opted out
making the OS in danger. In particular, it lost out to Apple and Google on user
interface (UI) and outsider developer support, which has forced it to catch up. The
Apple iPhone significantly advanced smartphone development with its LCD moni-
tor OS that made multitouch possible, and then developed a facile development
tool support system and developer system through its App Store. Compared to
this, Symbian is clearly outdated. In order to improve its smartphone OS strategy
(but still based on its own OS), Nokia started a new OS development project with
Samsung, but later called it off. Later it switched to an MS OS-based smartphone
strategy. Recently, it released its Lumia smartphones based on MS Windows 8. As
Nokia changes not into a multiple OS strategy as Samsung did, but into an MS
OS-based strategy, the global market share of the Symbian OS is decreasing
rapidly.
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In other words, Nokia is stuck with a closed innovation strategy for its own smart-
phone OS, and a similarly closed innovation strategy for its own smartphone OS. As a
result, the sales of Nokia, which used to be the world’s largest smartphone maker, are
rapidly dwindling.
Second, let us move to the complex adaptive system of the smartphone sector. Sam-
sung has deployed a smartphone OI strategy focused on software. A variety of phones
are differentiated and released to meet the requirements and expectations of each re-
gion. The same OS is used for all the various sizes and types of smartphones. Using this
approach, Samsung has succeeded in the development of new smartphones (e.g., one
with a note-taking feature, one with a five-inch screen, and a Bada OS-based
European-style smartphone), which have features different from those of other firms. In
the smartphone sector, Samsung has supplanted Nokia, and has now become an effect-
ive global competitor of Apple.
Apple has done a great deal to create the global smartphone sector, through its OS-
based OI strategy focused on hardware. It has created smartphone-dominant designs
with leading features (i.e., telephone, internet, touch screen, and mobile music service)
through iPhone. Furthermore, it created a new SmartPad sector with its iPad.
Nokia failed in open innovation on both the sides of hardware and software. Though
it was the leading developer in the smartphone sector, it failed to develop a global dom-
inant design in that sector and has since watched its initial market share rapidly
decrease.
It is certain that the smartphone sector is itself a typical complex adaptive system. As
the scale of the sector market has expanded, parts of the old sector have become en-
tirely new sectors. This smartphone sector has such a high degree of complexity that
its domination has changed rapidly from Nokia to Apple and Samsung. In terms of
dominant designs, new ones have appeared and previous ones disappeared, before the
new ones have even settled down.
We will now analyze the evolution of smartphone sector.
Apple formed its positive feedback loop based on an open business model. For ex-
ample, some consumers of iPhones developed iPhone applications and uploaded them
to the iPhone App Store, and because of this, the roles of the consumers of iPhones
and of iPhone applications, were strengthened. Similar to the evolutionary game theory,
the open business model allows consumers to turn into producers, and producers to
turn back into strengthened consumers. The open business model does not show the
phenomenon of exponential increase unlike the positive feedback loops provided by
supply-side economies of scale and scope. However, it has a structure that is increased
by the number of smartphone users, based on the foundation that the correlated eco-
system is expanded cumulatively and the intensity of usage by users becomes greater.
In other words, although the positive feedback loop based on the open business model
does not allow such rapid growth as do economies of scale, the intensity of usage by
consumers is extreme. The number of users increases greatly and enables the formation
of a new smartphone ecosystem that will not break up easily.
Samsung, by creating a positive feedback loop on the supply side through econ-
omies of scale and scope, has created evolutionary results: early differentiation
attained became a dominant design, which then evolved into a lock-in. The econ-
omies of scope have made access to various types of smartphone hardware easy in
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relatively short cycles, based on very diverse OS. In addition, Samsung has suc-
ceeded in producing smartphone hardware that is competitive in quality and price
through economies of scale attained by large-scale production based on closed
innovation.
Nokia created its initial economies of scale before the supply side of the smartphone
industry was well developed. As new concepts and differentiated smartphones ap-
peared, those initial economies of scale disappeared rapidly. Recently, Nokia has
attempted to make a comeback by releasing a new smartphone OS, MS Windows
8. By using an OS based on Windows 8 (Web-based, similar to MS Office), this
move is expected to enable economies of network. In this case, what is expected is
that the vast numbers of Windows consumers will become favored users of the
new Nokia products. If Nokia succeeds in creating economies of network based on
new consumers in the mobile sector using MS Windows 8, it will be able to form
a positive feedback loop much stronger than what could have been created by
supply-side economies of scale or scope.
OCE model simulation: results and discussion
The OCE ABM simulation predicts future business results created by the selection of
different OI strategies by competing firms. This simulation model was developed based
on the results from analyzing the current OCE conceptual model. In addition, the OCE
ABM model was aimed at predicting the market share of each firm among competing
Fig. 2 Prisoner’s dilemma game for OI
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agents in the future smartphone market, according to a variety of choices for open
innovation and degrees of complexity.
The strategies to be chosen by agents in the iterated game (model) are indicated in
Fig. 2, which shows the award values of the open innovation game.
Figure 2 shows a payoff matrix of dynamic open innovation games. For simplicity, let
us assume there are only two competing firms, A and B. πA(or πB) is product value of
firm A (or B) by its own technology. Without technology sharing, each firm gets πA(πB)
only (Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995). If a firm, let us it to be firm A, receives
technological cooperation from the other firm, it can enjoy two more value that is
added from that cooperation. First, it can develop its own technology to more advanced
level using technology of the other firm (benefit of technology advance, TA). This bene-
fit depends on the value of the other firm’s technology (PB) and its degree of con-
vergence to Firm A technology (αAB) (Duysters and Hagedoorn 1998). With more
value of technology and degree of convergence, Firm A can enjoy more benefit of
technology advance (TA = αABPB). Second, Firm A can enjoy opportunistic benefit
of commercializing firm B technology without any investment on it (benefit of op-
portunistic usage, βAB) (Teece 1986). On the other hand, technology cooperation
requires cost of losing technology monopoly. The sharing cost is greater when the
technology value (PA) and the degree of losing monopoly profit (γAB) are greater
(Porter 1985; Shan 1990).
With the foregoing explanations, we can get a payoff table, Fig. 2. All four of the pay-
off values satisfy the conditions of the prisoner’s dilemma just if we have a minimum
hypothesis that αAB*PB+ βAB≥γAB* PA (Press and Dyson 2012; Axelrod and Dion 1988).
Any firm which chooses open innovation has higher expectation benefits of open
innovation than losing expectation benefit of monopoly of its own technology. The pay-
off values of the prisoner’s dilemma were set based on the basic logic of open
innovation strategies.
In this model, according to the degree of openness and the degree of complexity, OCE
model was simulated based on payoff values in Fig. 2. Our OCE simulation model
(NetLogo 4.0.3) is based on the “NetLogo Ethnocentrism model,” which is a NetLogo ver-
sion of the ethnocentrism model (Hammond and Axelord 2006; Wilensky 2006). We used
‘openness’ instead of ‘mutation rate’, which is a chance of each trait mutating. It means
how much ratio of new knowledge, which is different from existing knowledge, appears at
the sector. We use ‘complexity’ instead of ‘death rate’, the chances of dying or mortality,
making room for future offspring and immigrants (see Appendix 1). Complexity means
what ratio of firms among competitors disappears in the sector when they are
defeated in open-closed innovation strategy competition. High competition means
high complexity. OCE model for Smartphone market has 4 agencies according to
their innovation types, open or closed, in Hardware (H/W) and Operating System
(OS) like Fig. 3. These 4 agencies breed descendants according to the ABM pro-
gramming logic in Appendix 2. Breeding logic at Appendix 2 is basically complex
that the breeding possibility of any type of agency is not confirmed even though it
follows prisoner’s dilemma but fluid according to the level of open innovation and
complexity.
Figure 4 shows OCE simulation results in smartphone market. In high open
innovation situation, OC and CO agencies win over OO and CC. This has enough
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meaning in that firms should use closed innovation and open innovation simultan-
eously when new technology appears in high speed. In high complexity, the fluctu-
ation in percent in market between the competing firms was very severe (upper
parts of Fig. 4.) High fluctuation between the firms in high complexity situation
means that the firms compete each other more seriously because death rate of
losing agencies increases.
The example of CO in high complexity and high OI can be recent Samsung.
And the example of OC in high complexity and high OI can be recent Apple.
Until 2013, whenever Samsung and Apple introduce new product in smartphone
market, they try to use newest technology in both of H/W and S/W. So they are
in high open innovation condition. In addition, whenever they introduce new
Fig. 3 4 Agencies in OCE model for Smartphone sector
Fig. 4 OCE simulation results in Smartphone sector
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products, market share fluctuates between these 2 firms. Samsung produce nearly
all H/W parts of its smartphone by itself and adopts a lot of OSs from outside. So
Samsung is a CO agency in high complexity and high open innovation condition.
Oppositely, Apple produces its OS by itself and adopts almost part of its smart-
phone H/W from outside. So Apple is a OC agency in high complexity and high
open innovation condition.
The example of CC in high complexity and high OI can be Nokia and Black-
berry. Until recently, Nokia has its own OS made by MS and keep most of its H/
W parts made by itself. Blackberry is similar in situation with Nokia because it
also has its own OS and H/W manufacturing system. Nokia occupies only small
part of market share in smartphone market under competition with Blackberry.
And the example of OO in high complexity and high OI can be Amazon smart
pad if we expand examples of our OCE model into related business. If Amazon
moves to smartphone sector, it will be OO example in high complexity and high
OI. Additionally two significant findings can be caught from OCE simulation re-
sults in smartphone market (Fig. 4). One is the changing of winning groups from
(OC & CO) to (OO & CC) with the change in open innovation level. When the
innovation level goes down in the market, dominant firms may change their open
innovation strategy from one-open-and-open-closed to all-open or all-closed. An-
other finding is that although high complexity makes high fluctuation in market
share, complexity itself is not the trigger of changing in dominant strategy and
dominant firm. So the decrease in profit rate and increase in death rate as results
of fierce competition in smartphone market should be thought as the change in
complexity.
Attention should be paid to Fig. 5. The results of the simulations indicate that
winner groups in the market begin to change when the level of open innovation
has reached at a critical point. That is, in the case of the current smartphone
Fig. 5 Change of OCE simulation results according to the level of open innovation
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sector with a high degree of open innovation, dominant firms peruse OC, or CO
strategies. However, the results indicate that, if the degree of open innovation de-
creases as the market matures, firms that pursue OO, or CC strategies will domin-
ate smartphone market. If the need for new knowledge decreases because the
market and related technologies have matured, the innovation strategies of firms
may be changed from OC, or CO strategies to CC or OO strategies. From this, we
can guess that if smartphone market matures, diverse OO strategy firms like Ama-
zon kindle which producing Smart pad with any OS and any H/W can appear. In
addition, current OI or CI firms may move to CC strategies when smartphone
market and related technologies matures.
Implications and conclusion
Open innovation grows with technology openness strategy of firms, complex adaptive
systems, and market responses stimulated by technology innovations. The firms are
main entities that make such evolution in the market as important autonomous agents
in the whole innovation system. Open innovation can evolve and arrive at a dominant
design, and often be locked-in according to a positive feedback loop. This might be
provided by supply-side economies of scale and scope, demand-side economies of net-
work, or by an open business model that affects both the supply and demand sides. But
sometimes, open innovation may fail because of many surrounding conditions in mar-
ket, technology and regulations.
We have tried to answer the question that ‘in what conditions of market and technol-
ogy, open innovation is going to be effective?’, and ‘which types of open innovation will
be more?’. In this purpose, we developed repeated open innovation game situation and
have set and run an ABM model for the situation. For the analysis and implications of
the model, we selected smartphone market and major players in it, Apple, Nokia, and
Samsung. With brief case study on smartphone market, we could find innovation strat-
egies of the players and could apply their strategies into the model.
With the results of ABM model, we could find several important implications.
First, in highly innovative situation that usually happens at the early stage of industry
(high open innovation situation), one-open-and-one-closed open strategy, that keeps a
firm’s own core part (H/W or OS) to be closed and weak part to be openly searched, can
be effective. As example, Samsung keeps closed their H/W part and openly searches OS
from outside. Apple is doing oppositely, it searches and adopts its H/W from outside and
keeps closed its OS. Second, in less innovative situation of matured market, all-open or
all-closed strategy can be preferred. In matured market, technologies of all competing
firms do not show significant difference and price competition is much more important.
In such a situation, all-open strategy that aims to get more cost advantage and compatibil-
ity with other formats, or all-closed strategy that aims to keep closed its own core compe-
tence and brand equity, are going to be much more effective.
Technology firms that are going to make important decisions on technology open-
ness can get meaningful implications from the results. A firm could change their open
innovation strategy based on market condition. In early stage of high open innovation,
it could adopt one-open-and-one-closed strategy. But, with matured market and low
open innovation situation, it could change its strategy to all-closed or all-open strategy.
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The model of open innovation suggested here still have much room for develop-
ment and ABM model could be more precisely developed with more consideration.
Through additional research, this model should be developed, validated, and fasci-
nated. Several concrete cases should be added to validate this model enough. But,
additional cases will be the goals of future research. But the findings of the model
still give beneficial implications for the firms in high technology industries for their
open innovation strategies, about which strategy going to adopt and when to
change their technology openness.
Appendix 1
Table 1 Comparing between H&A model and OCE model
H&A model OCE model
Mutation ratio Level of open innovation
Death rate Level of complexity (competition level)
Cost of cooperation [ Firm A = γABPA ]
[ Firm B = γBAPB ]
γAB : Degree of losing monopoly profit of firm A by sharing its technology with
firm B
γBA: Degree of losing monopoly profit of firm B by sharing its technology with
firm A
PA : Value of technology owned by firm A
PB : Value of technology owned by firm B
Benefit of receiving [ Firm A = αABPB + βAB ]
[ Firm B = αBAPA + βBA ]
αAB : Degree of technology convergence from firm B technology to firm A
technology
βAB : Opportunistic benefit of firm A by not investing in and freely using firm B
technology
αBA : Degree of convergence from firm A technology to firm B technology
βBA : Opportunistic benefit of firm A by not investing in and freely using firm B
technology
Lattice Size Lattice Size
= Size of Population = Size of Market
Percent = Amount of
Population
Percent = Amount of Market
Color Color
Blue : humanitarian Red : H/W, S/W all open-innovation (OI)
Green : ethnocentric Blue : H/W, S/W all closed-innovation (CI)
Yellow : traitorous Violet : H/W OI, S/W CI
Red : selfish Green : H/W CI, S/W OI
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Appendix 2
Abbreviation
OCE: open innovation, complexity adaptive system, and evaluation change, This is defined by authors to explain the
dynamic change of open innovation.
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